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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

نحمده ونصلي على رسوله الكريم

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MUSLIM SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN

FAZLUR RAHMAN

I. INTRODUCTION

Islam aims at the creation of a healthy, progressive and moral social order. Although, Islam patently recognizes the basic and, indeed, ultimate worth of the individual and of individual responsibility, nevertheless it *per se* cannot be fulfilled except in a social context.[1] This is the reason why along with individual responsibility, the Qur'ān also speaks of collective responsibility or responsibility of a society as such. The first prerequisite of a good social order is to inculcate excellence of individual character in man. Only good men can create a good society. But, conversely, only the creation of a good society is the real test of a good individual. The Qur'ān, therefore, sternly rejects any suggestion to the effect that goodness may exist at the individual level but may be compromised at the collective level with expediency and other extraneous considerations—a view advocated strongly, e.g. by the celebrated contemporary Christian theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, in his work, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*.[2]

The Qur'ān, therefore, enunciates certain fundamental principles of social organization. These principles are those of social justice, cooperation, brotherhood and self-sacrifice for the sake of the common good. Human equality belongs to the very essence of this teaching and, in effect, the entire Islamic movement and the teachings of the Qur'ān can be seen as directed towards the creation of a meaningful and positive equality among human beings. As such, the Islamic purpose cannot be realized until genuine freedom to human being is restored and freedom from all forms of exploitation—social, spiritual, political and economic—assured. It is only then that real cooperation, brotherhood and self-sacrifice can become realities.

Such a social order must be brought into existence and all impediments in its way are to be removed as being moral impediments

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in the development of mankind. The inertia and recalcitrance of people to the establishment of such a social order has to be overcome. People have to be made conscripts in the path of goodness, so to say, if they suffer from inertia. This is a lesson which unmistakably emerges from the entire struggle of the Prophet and the guidelines given by the Qur'ān.[3] This is the limitation on human freedom. It must be remembered that freedom as such has no meaning unless it is freedom *from* something and freedom *for* something ; to seek refuge behind cheap slogans of freedom in order to avoid the bearing of constructive social responsibility is one of the factors which, according to the Qur'ān, constitute unpardonable "hypocrisy".[4]

In order to achieve the society envisaged, it is necessary to create effective institutions which shall constitute the proper instrument for the implementation of social values and ideals. Our century has witnessed a terrific amount of ideological warfare between the two camps of Communism and Western type Democracy. The crucial point at issue between these two camps has been that Communism created certain totalitarian institutions which took away, in the interests of creating a strong, just and viable society, a great chunk of what has been traditionally regarded by human society as the precincts of individual's rights. If the Qur'ān is closely studied from this point of view, it seems to be neutral to this whole struggle provided certain limits are observed in the encroachment on the individual's rights. Within these limits, the society shall have the freedom to curb individual freedom—if it is found absolutely necessary in the interest of social weal. The same idea can be expressed by saying that where normal cooperation between individuals of a society fails or the society finds itself in a plight where voluntary self-sacrifice, which the Qur'ān terms *iḥsān*, is either not forthcoming or is not forthcoming adequately for the necessary social needs, then self-sacrifice may not be allowed to remain voluntary but may be embodied in enforceable forms ; that which was in the sphere of *iḥsān* will be assumed into the sphere of necessary obligations.[5]

The immediate family, however, has a sanctity which should not be allowed to be transgressed against. In its social organization, while Islam aimed at breaking the tribal loyalties in favour of the larger human loyalty or loyalty to the *Ummah*, it sought to strengthen proportionately the ties within the immediate family.

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Unfortunately, however, the Muslim society is, by and large, again suffering from these intermediate loyalties of tribalism and semi-tribalism, which are parasites on both the larger social organizations and also on the immediate family. This basic unit of social organization, i.e. the immediate family has to be re-emphasized along with the emphasis on the social organization particularly, because it is exposed to grave dangers both from the modern Western pattern of industrialized society and from the methods pursued by the Communist society.

II. SOCIAL JUSTICE

The impulse for social justice and the establishment of the recognition of the equal essential worth of men provided one of the most basic motivations for the launching of the Islamic movement. It was the violation of this basic principle of human society and the consequent gross disparities that existed, particularly in the commercial milieu of the Mecca of the Prophet's day which originally disturbed the mind of the Prophet and compelled him to retire periodically to the cave Ḥirā and provided "the burden upon his back" which was relieved by the Message that he finally received (Qur'ān, XCIV: 2). If one studies the earliest revelations of the Qur'ān carefully, one finds this theme insistently preached beside that of the Unity of God.[6] The Qur'ān seems to say that since God is one, there can be no essential divisions and disparities among human beings, who are the highest of God's creation. Thus, monotheism becomes meaningful in the eyes of the Qur'ān only if it results in the moral consequence of the basic equality of mankind. Divorced from this consequence, monotheism becomes meaningless and is, in fact, monolatry (i.e. worship of only one being).

So fundamental characteristic is this of the Islamic teaching that the Prophet, in his farewell sermon (which as a charter of universal human freedom constitutes the most important landmark in the entire history of mankind) devoted a major part to this theme: "All of you are descended from Adam . . , no Arab has any excellence over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, nor a white-coloured person over a black one, nor a black one over a white one, except as a desert of his righteousness".[7] The Qur'ān itself tells us that the human race was created from one pair and, indeed, even from one soul (IV, I; VII: 189), thus unequivocally

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asserting the consubstantiality of the entire human race.

Nor does the Qur'ān stop only at eradicating racial discrimination; it asserts time and again that any exclusive claim on the part of any organized religious group to proprietary rights over God and Truth are absolutely without foundation. Indeed, the Islamic movement was partly an assertion to repudiate such claims put forward by the Jews and the Christians: "They say: (O Muḥammad) if you become Jews or Christians, you will come to the right path. Say: guidance is the guidance of God" (III:73). Indeed, the Qur'ān describes the proprietary rights over Truth by Jews and Christians as "their wishful thinking (*amānīy*)" (II : 111; cf. IV : 122). To the Muslims the Qur'ān addressed exactly the same message and told them that if they did not really implement what Islam stood for, then "God will bring a people other than you who will not be like you" (XLVII: 38). The Qur'ān thus teaches man to always aspire for Truth and declares the attitude, where one comes to rest placidly in what one has and despises others, as utterly un-Islamic. This itself constitutes the very essence of Islam and also points to the door for that meaningful intercourse between different religious communities which is so essential for building up not only a viable world-order but, indeed, any sane and progressive society. It was from this position that the Qur'ān invited the Jews and the Christians to come forward and join in an endeavour to create a more just social order wherein all humans as humans may find their maximum fulfilment (III: 64).

Islam thus may be described as a social reform movement whose centre of interest lies in the welfare and well-being of man—provided this term is understood to include moral welfare as well and is not just restricted to the provision of 'basic necessities' as they are understood today. What emerges most clearly from the entire drift of the Qur'ān and the Prophet's actions on this point is that no moral or spiritual welfare is possible without a sound and just socio-economic base. Indeed, one may correctly assert that the rectitude of moral life in Islam is to be tested by, and is finally realized in, this society-building activity. In a very early *Sūrah*, the Qur'ān says: "Did you see the one who gives the lie to the Faith? This is the person who maltreats the orphans and who does not exhort others to the welfare of the poor. Woe betide then, such persons as pray, but who are neglectful of their prayers. Those who keep up a facade (of moral rectitude), but prevent the

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utilization of ordinary things (to others)". (*Sūrah* CVII). By the very testimony of the Qur'ān, then, prayers themselves are meaningless unless they result in actual works of human weal. This is what one means when one says that Islam is not an "other-worldly" religion, i.e., when one says that the realization and fulfilment of moral exaltedness and spiritual loftiness lies in the consequences which they have for this world. In a nutshell, inconsequential Islam is no Islam at all.

This does not mean that there are no distinctions whatever among men and that there is such a thing as absolute equality. For religious documents are so definite as the Qur'ān itself in stating that people differ in their aptitudes, capacities and powers, both mental and moral. In the preceding issue of this Journal this is exactly what we described at length when we explained the meaning of the words *taqdīr* and *'amr*. This is so much so the case that no two persons are exactly the same just as there is no actual recurrence of any event. The point, however, is that the Qur'ān wants to build a society where every individual shall have the opportunity to realize his potentialities. This is what is today called "equality of opportunities". But the term "equality of opportunities" has to be understood carefully. There can be such a thing as equality or near-equality of lack of opportunities, or there can be an equality in minimum opportunities. What the Qur'ān wants is not an equality in privation, but equality in possession, i.e. the maximization of facilities for individuals to realize their potentialities. The second allied point to be noted in this connection is that Islam is not envisaging a state of affairs where, in a society, individuals will be left alone with facilities or with certain facilities to avail themselves of these. The society envisaged by Islam is a purposefully directed society, not a deliberately left-alone or neglected ('free') society[8] as is the case in some of the so-called "Welfare States" of the contemporary West. Social justice in Islam means a positive involvement in society. It cannot simply rest content with "live and let live"—no matter how you live and how others live. Islam is a charter for interference in society and this charter gives to the collective institution of the society, i.e. the Government, the right and duty to constantly watch, give direction to, and actually mould the social fabric.[9]

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III. ERADICATION OF EXPLOITATION

The Islamic demand of social justice among men cannot be met unless all forms of exploitation of man by man are totally removed. Indeed, in the development of mankind, the most crucial role of Islam has been to act as the liberating force from spiritual tyranny, social discrimination, economic exploitation and political subjugation. The necessary conditions for the releasing of human energies for positive construction of a good social order must remain a vain aspiration so long as such forms of exploitations remain in any shape. It would be, indeed, a bare truth to say that Islam was the midwife for the birth of a free humanity. This is not contradicted by the fact that during the long centuries of its own medieval existence, Muslim society itself had greatly continued to suffer, and in large areas still suffers, from several of these forms of exploitations.

In the moral and spiritual sphere, Islam came out decisively and unequivocally against intermediaries between man and God and made every human individual the direct and proper locus of moral responsibility.[10] It is well-known that there is no clergy in Islam. The Qur'ān even accuses the religious leadership of the Jews and the Christians of having set themselves up as mouthpieces of God and on this score condemned them as "*mushriks*" (III : 64 ; IX : 3). When the doctrinal struggle developed between the Qur'ān and the Meccan pagans, the Meccans offered a compromise to the Prophet whereby they were prepared to accept the one God of Muḥammad, provided he agreed to the installation of the pagan gods as "intermediaries" and "intercederes" (*shufa'ā'*). The Qur'ān uncompromisingly rejected this offer and insisted that every human was directly capable of bearing the moral responsibility before God (X : 15-19 ; XXXIX : 3 ; etc.).

There are few more insistent themes in the Qur'ān than that every man must think for himself, must use his reason and must come to his own decision.[11] It is, of course, natural that the Qur'ān should call upon Muslims to produce a group of people who would provide creative religious leadership for them.[12] But the function of this class of people is only to provide enlightened and creative religious leadership and not to become arbitrators of what is right or wrong or exclusive exponents of the Will of God. They constitute the leaven of intellectual and moral Islamic thought and not the religious dictatorship, for, in the last analysis, it is the

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function of the community as such to accept or reject the opinions created by this class which are technically called *'ulamā'*.[13] The present-day situation, therefore, where the *'ulamā'* (irrespective of whether they possess *'ilm* or not), claim an exclusive prerogative of possessing the religious truth is utterly un-Islamic.

But this is not all. The *'ulamā'*, when their position is clarified and they are endowed with genuine and enlightened knowledge, have a most fundamental function to perform in society. In the meantime, another far more heinous form of spiritual exploitation developed in Muslim society after the first centuries of Islam, which took the entire world of Islam by storm from the 12th century onwards. A new class of spiritual doctors arose, known as *pīrs* or *shaykhs*, who claimed to conduct the souls of men through a spiritual itinerary (*ṭarīqah*) to God. The phenomenon developed rapidly with the decline of Islam as a socio-political fabric and filled the vacuum during the medieval period. But such a claim, when put beside the entire teaching of the Qur'ān seems so alien to it that one is only astonished at its persistence even today. It is a gross form of spiritual, social and economic exploitation. Sociologically, of course, it is rooted in certain deep-seated factors of ignorance, poverty and, above all, uncertainty and insecurity of life. This is not to deny the existence of spiritually endowed persons who lead a virtuous life and a life of service. What we are up against is (*i*) the exploitation of spiritual gifts for economic ends and (*ii*) Pīrdom as a hereditary phenomenon.

As for the economic exploitation, we have already pointed out in Section II above, that economic injustice and consequent social tyranny, obtaining in the milieu of Mecca, was the immediate condition giving rise to the Islamic movement. The volcanic outbursts of the Qur'ān against those who hoarded wealth and cared little for the weal of the society are so many and so patent that they hardly need any documentation. But the Qur'ān did not rest content with simple declaration of policy and pious hopes. It took a series of concrete steps and enunciated definite measures to remedy the situation. The complete banning of usury is one of the measures, the imposition of the *Zakāh*-tax is another. The Qur'ān, in fact, stated point-blank that there was a part of the wealth which did not belong to the wealthy people—even if they had "earned" it—but belonged to the welfare of the society and the needs of the have-nots. According to the Qur'ān, it is not the

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case that the wealthy, in setting apart this portion of wealth, are making a self-sacrifice : this portion of wealth does not belong to them.[14]

This clearly shows that although Islam patently recognizes the right to earn and own wealth and recognizes other human freedoms, nevertheless, it calls upon the society to encroach upon this freedom when the interests of the society imperatively so demand. Islam does not question basically the right to earn and own wealth—on the contrary, as we shall see later on in this series of articles, it incites man to earn wealth—nevertheless, since the interests of the society as a whole so required, the wealthy were deprived of a part of their wealth which they had previously lawfully enjoyed. This part, to be appropriated by the society, can always be increased or decreased according to needs, provided only that it does not kill the earning motive itself. The Qur'ān, therefore, seems to enunciate the principle that you cannot rightfully own this wealth and have the freedom to enjoy it when people around you are starving.

In the socio-political field, Islam declared all Muslims—and, indeed, all humans—to be equal and free. Before Islam, the Arabs had known certain democratic institutions of running their affairs by mutual consultation, known as *Shūrā* or *Nadwah* (*Nādī*). The Qur'ān confirmed this democratic institution and asked the Muslims to carry on and decide their affairs by free participation, equal collaboration and mutual consultation.[15] Nobody may take anybody else's property, life or honour.[16] The Qur'ānic conception of running the society by cohesion, mutual confidence and consultation, therefore, goes against the grain of any suggestion of both autocratic rule or even of a party-system as such—questions we shall discuss more fully in the next article. Islam gave equal rights to all humans irrespective of creed and colour (caste is foreign to Islam) and conferred upon women the proper economic and social personality. Again, if Muslim history ran in directions other than envisaged by the Qur'ān, it is because the peoples who began to participate in the Islamic faith early or transformed its social and political modes beyond recognition.

In conformity with its spirit of the essential equity of mankind, Islam bestowed on the woman the rights of a full personality. The Qur'ān insistently forbids the male to exploit the female on the strength of his stronger position in society and Islam set into

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motion a whole complex of measures—legal and moral—whereby sex exploitation would be completely eradicated. It forbade the recourse to polygamy under normal circumstances, allowed the woman to own and earn wealth, declared her to be an equal partner with man in the society ; noting and allowing for the disadvantages she had in the society of that age. It laid down the basis of matrimonial life to be mutual love and affection and that the spouses were like "garments unto each other". It strictly regulated the law of divorce.[17] Later Muslim history, however, did not do full justice to the objective of the Qur'ān on the subject and, consequently, due to unregulated polygamy and divorce and their baneful effects on children, Muslim society deteriorated through the Middle Ages. This trend has to be sternly and quickly checked. Fortunately, most of the Muslim countries have already taken effective steps towards this goal. It is obvious that the woman ought to play a most crucial role in society, not only in the home as a wife and a mother but in the uplift of the society in its various fundamental spheres. A society which neglects and retards the growth of the potentialities of the woman has to pay dearly in terms of maladjustments, demoralization of children, and utter and criminal waste of human resources.

As part of its programme of emancipation of man from the shackles of inhibition and superstitions, Islam sought to restore to labour the dignity that it deserved. The Prophet himself and many of his eminent Companions had the experience of manual work. Since the Prophet was a trader by profession, those who opposed his Mission chose to ridicule him for frequenting the market-place.[18] The Prophet is reported to have said that the labour of workman must be paid before his sweat is dry.[19] In fact, all productive labour is regarded by Islam as an *'ibādah*, i.e. service to God and, far from being disparaged or decried, it is regarded as highly praiseworthy. It is also well-known that many great Imāms and religious doctors of Islam in the early period had been men belonging to various professions.[20] The rights of labour were in general regarded as being so sacred that, according to some *Ḥadīths*, God's greatest displeasure is earned by a person who deprives a labourer of his just reward.[21] Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) strongly advocated that all the wealthy people of a city must be compelled to set apart a portion of their wealth for purposes of social insurance in favour of their needy fellow-citizens. According to him, this

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follows necessarily from the teaching of the Qur'ān.[22]

During the medieval centuries, however, through foreign influence, Muslims also began to look down upon labour and it came to be regarded beneath the dignity of a gentleman to handle anything manually. Even agricultural work was discouraged in the name of Islam.[23] In view of the fact that many of the eminent Companions of the Prophet were themselves agriculturists, this view seems very strange ; it, nevertheless, gained currency in certain circles. It is necessary that Muslims be reinstilled with the proper spirit of the dignity of beneficial and productive labour which it enjoys in Islam.

But with all the freedom and the equality which Islam confers on individuals, it makes these conditional upon and subject to the imperative demands of the society as a whole. Thus, Islam will not brook any split in the community, no matter on how grandiose moral bases such a split is launched. The cause of *Masjid al-Ḍirār* is well known; the Qur'ān condemned that mosque as a house of not worship but of mischief. It laid down the severest possible punishment for rebellion—for example the cutting of right hand and left foot and then execution (V : 33). This does not mean that Islam does not allow criticism which is a *sine qua non* for any progress. But criticism has to be a part of this entire mechanism of mutual consultation and may not be launched as a platform which is likely to dividethe community. The Qur'ān even asks the Government to disallow the public broadcast of news which is not in the public interest, and denounced such practice as a mischievous licence calculated to demoralise the people and disunite them (IV : 82).

IV. ISLAMIC COOPERATION

The foregoing pages have already introduced us to the most basic fact about the constitution of the Islamic society, viz. that it aims at creating a good individual through and for a good society. The rights and claims of the individual should not only "adjust themselves" to but should also be fulfilled in and through a strong society and although maximum freedom is to be granted to individuals to develop their potentialities, yet this freedom must be subject to and at the same time realized in and through the channels of a society wherein all centrifugal tendencies must be sternly checked. This gives us the idea of

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a positive balance which may be said to underlie the whole idea of an Islamic structure of society. This is why the Qur'ān described Muslims as *ummatan wasaṭan*, a "middle community", i.e. a community of balance (II : 143). The term "balance", however, may and, indeed, often is, conceived in a primarily negative sense. This is because, generally speaking, balance is supposed to mean a "fitting of various things together", and, therefore, implies a "taking away" of parts of everything so that they can mutually fit in. It is, thus, said that individuals have to forego part of themselves, i.e. make self-sacrifice, in order to create a good society, and in general it is supposed that a good society lives and thrives at the expense of individuals.

In order to avoid this kind of misconception and distinguish the Islamic concept from it, we have constantly used the phrase "being fulfilled in society" or "being realized through society". The truth is that the Islamic conception of relationship of individuals in a society is not just negative, i.e. in terms of making adjustments only, but is a positive one. When an individual makes so-called "sacrifice" for society, he is not really losing himself, but is fulfilling himself. The idea of the "balance" which thus emerges has a positive and dynamic meaning and does not simply connote the mutual neutralization of claims, rights and obligations. The Qur'ān tells us that "the Faithful are but brothers" (XLIX : 10). A brother, when he takes pains for the sake of his brother, is, in a definite sense, not sacrificing himself, but fulfilling himself. History knows well that when the Prophet emigrated from Mecca to Medina, he created "brotherhood (*mu'ākhāh*)" between the emigrants and the local Muslims of Medina. This was a State-ordained arrangement whereby the local Muslims were asked to share their properties and lands half-and-half with the emigrants from Mecca in order to rehabilitate the latter.

The active seeking of the welfare of the society and enlisting people's support to this end is a cardinal principle of Islam according to the Qur'ān. For example, the Qur'an tells us, describing the Muslims, that "they are full of faith, they do good works, and they enlist each other's support for righteous causes and in patience"; again, "(the faithful are those) who have faith and mutually support each other in patience and in mercy" (CIII : 1-3). That the Muslims must work together and co-operate in good undertaking is an explicit injunction enjoined

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upon by the Qur'ān (CIII : 3 ; XC : 17). We have already quoted several verses to the effect that Muslims are duty bound to actively and cooperatively undertake good and beneficial works and warning that those peoples who have been unable or have refused to undertake such works, have been doomed to destruction (XCII: 15 ff., etc.). The Prophet is reported to have said, "*Dīn* consists in the active pursuit of the welfare of people (*Al-dīn al-naṣīḥaḥ*)."[24] This clearly implies that a person who does not actively cooperate in the walfare of humanity is devoid of *dīn* or faith.

These quotations from the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* demonstrate that pure self-seeking is tantamount to self-destruction. This is what the Qur'ān terms as the most persistent satanic delusion, because this is precisely where one thinks that one is benefiting oneself and is realizing one's interests, whereas actually he is defeating the very same interests. This is what we mean by positive self-realization through society. Wherever the Qur'ān says that the previous nations were visited by their doom, it tells us that their leaders, people in authority and, generally speaking, the responsible sections of the community had become pure self-seekers and that, therefore, nothing could prevent their downfall (e.g. XVII: 16).

It is important that an effective campaign be undertaken to make all strata of people vested with any authority or responsibility or influence, up to the grade of the Basic Democrats, realize the full import of what this means. For this purpose, the services of the local religious leadership, i.e. the Imāms and Khaṭībs must be enlisted besides the State media of publicity. In fact, all members of the society must be made to realize, and realize starkly that unless they positively cooperate for good and produce results, their doom is not going to be any different from other bygone nations. People must be taught to become self-reliant in discovering social needs, formulating projects on the basis of these needs and executing these projects. The Government must be there to aid only ; the primary initiative must come from the hearts and minds of the people themselves. To help those who will not help themselves is somehow excluded from God's conduct in history if we are to believe the Qur'ān (XIII : 54 ; XIII : 12).

But Islam does not stop short only at cooperation within the members of a given society or area. It envisages a progressively widening sphere of cooperation. From what we have said so far

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it is abundantly clear that the Muslims cannot even be genuinely Muslims if they do not cooperate with each other. It is, therefore, incumbent upon Muslim States and communities to cooperate in beneficial ventures. It is in this light that an arrangement like that of the RCD becomes Islamically significant. Efforts, however, should continue to be made to enlist as many other Muslim States as possible. Muslim unity is among the most primary requirements of Islam.

But Islam also envisages an achievement of, and positive thrust for, a world-wide cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. This is equally an Islamic requirement. We recall the Qur'ān's invitation to the Jews and the Christians, "to come together on a platform that is common between us" (III : 64), in the interests of cooperation for the benefit of mankind in general. It is not realized enough by Muslims that to actively seek the benefit of mankind in general is an Islamic demand and that this has to be fulfilled in line with the demand for Muslim unity and cooperation. We know that during the history of Islam, the various schools of *Fiqh* have adopted a spectrum of attitudes on this question, but the attitude of the Qur'ān is clear enough as has been brought out in the preceding paragraphs.

V. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The main purposes which the Muslim society has to fulfil may, then, be said to be basically three: defence, development and welfare. The state organizations instrumental to this effect, viz. the Government (Executive), the Legislature and the Judiciary will be discussed in the next article. It may be said here that the overall administrative control of the entire collective life of the community will, in the opinion of this writer, vest in the Executive. But the three functions mentioned, namely those of defence, development and welfare, should be carried out not only with the Governmet resources but are to be implemented generally by the society as a whole. The Government will supervise and control the exercise of those functions by the society, but a number of institutions must be envisaged in order to carry out those all-comprehensive functions.

Defence is the most primary obligation of both the society and the Government. This function is so important that a very considerable part of the Qur'ān is devoted to it. "And prepare for them (i.e. for your enemies) whatever (weapons of) power you

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can" (VIII : 61). The Qur'ān teems with verses of similar import. A society or a Government which fails to take adequate steps for ensuring the defence and integrity of the Muslim territory is not even worthy of its name. But the teachings of the Qur'ān and the struggle of the Prophet make it equally clear that whereas it is necessary to keep a well-equipped standing army, this may not be sufficient. If and when the need arises, the entire nation must be ready to take part in defence activities and in its various ancillary sectors. Muslims are, indeed, forbidden from transgressing against anyone, but equally are they forbidden from being transgressed against. The Qur'ān wants that the enemies of Muslims should be "filled with their i.e. Muslims' fright" (VIII: 1, etc.).

Since the active participation of the society as a whole is necessary in the all-embracing activities of defence, development and welfare, as we shall discuss in the following paragraphs, it is necessary to create certain institutions and to destroy certain others. We have already emphasized that Islam cannot brook any tribal or parochial loyalties. Such *birādarī* or group affiliations, therefore, as are likely to harm the overall interests of the society, must be steadfastly eliminated and, at their expense, the larger social loyalty on the one hand and the loyalties among the immediate family, i.e. husband, wife and children, on the other, must be strengthened. This is because the immediate family is the basic unit without which no viable society can be contemplated. It is through the love and affection within the immediate family that the proper morale of the children can be nurtured, who are the future nation. It is in this light that the Family Law Reforms must be envisaged, appreciated and carried out despite whatever temporary opposition there may be. Polygamy and easy divorce are the two acids which can corrode the Muslim society at its very base and there is little doubt that among the major factors which have caused a numbing of the positive role on the part of the Muslim society in the past has been our unhealthy family situation.

Along with loyalty to *birādarīs* and tribes, the back of the feudal system must be effectively broken. Whereas it must be conceded that during the agrarian and particularly medieval history of mankind, feudalism has played, to some extent, a stabilizing role in society, it remains absolutely true that whatever stability there has existed has been at the expense of the largest number of masses

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and agrarian labour whose morale it has well-nigh destroyed. We have also pointed out previously to the evil wrought by the phenomenon of Pirdom. It again must be conceded that in a milieu of uncertainty, ignorance and poverty, Pirdom has had some positive role to play. But its vices have both overwhelmed and outlived any virtues that it has had and in a modern society it can be only regarded as an organized form of exploitation. It has to be borne in mind that whatever forms of religion we have rampant in our society, particularly Pirdom, are an outgrowth of the medieval agrarian way of life and in one way or the other a pillar of feudalism.

Our Mullā suffers from the handicap of the same medieval outlook and has developed a resistance to all modern ideas. His way of thinking has to be changed. For this it is necessary to pass him through an entirely overhauled syllabus of education, a question which we shall discuss in greater detail in the last article of this series. It should be pointed out, however, that whereas a reformed Mullā is a necessity for a society, a Pīr is a parasite and the two must be clearly distinguished. The Mullā, however, has to come under State control directly or indirectly and this brings us to the question of the positive institutions envisaged for the reconstruction of the society.

The participation of the society as a whole in defence, development and welfare, is only possible if these activities are vested in locally based institutions. For this a close cooperation between the local Imāms and Khaṭībs on the one hand and the Basic Democracies on the other, is absolutely necessary. For example, whatever courses in defence or activities related to defence are to be given, may be given under the auspices of the Basic Democracies but with the moral backing of the local Imāms. When the Qur'ān is so insistent and the Prophet's legacy is so compellingly clear, one fails to understand why the resources of the local religious leadership has not been utilized for this purpose so far.

Similarly, in the sectors of development, the tremendous emphasis which Islam puts on the eradication of poverty and need, and on the creation of wealth which it constantly terms "good (*khayr*)" and "God's bounty (*faḍl Allāh*)", can go a long way in instilling the necessary zeal for economic development. For this purpose, the local Imāms and Khaṭībs may undergo a short course of instruction themselves so that the religious leadership itself

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becomes enlightened. It has to be constantly emphasized that Islam has a world-affirming attitude and the Qur'ān wants Muslims to go out in the world and do good and create the necessary wealth to achieve this goodness, without this the Islamic purposes will surely come to naught. In this connection the teachings of great personages like Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī, Shāh Walīy Allāh and Iqbal may be fully utilized in the light of the Qur'ān.

Equally important is social welfare. We have often quoted the Qur'ān in the foregoing pages to the effect that without social weal neither worship is any good nor wealth, but both have to be regarded as necessary means for the furtherance of the welfare of mankind. The local religious leadership must be utilized by the local social welfare agencies. It is a duty of the Imām to try to give constructive moral advice to people in family feuds as well as on occasions when crimes threaten to occur, where thefts are committed, where murders are frequent, where bribery is rampant, etc. The *khuṭbah* of the Khaṭībs must be specifically addressed to their own moral environments and definite problems and needs rather than being directed either against imaginary targets like the "westernized" class or the Government.

It is suggested that the local development should be vested in a combination comprising the Basic Democrats and the Imāms. Whereas the executive work in the fields of local development, e.g. agriculture, hospitals, road-building, primary schools and small cottage industry, be vested in the Basic Democracies, the moral training and inspiration necessary for the task must be given in the mosques. The mosque should develop into a Community Centre, with a Primary School or a Maktab attached to it. In the evening, this Centre should provide constructive lectures, documentary films, etc., for the instruction and healthy entertainment of the young. We have already said that the Imām or Khaṭīb should be directly or indirectly an employee of the State. He may be employed either directly by the Auqaf Department or by the local Government, whatever is feasible. It is only through the evolution of this kind of basic structure that the development of the country can be hoped for. Otherwise, the Government itself, with all its resources, will be able to achieve only a fraction of the colossal development needs required. Even so, there would be a deadly race against time, and time waits for no one. Besides, as we have emphasized, the participation of the entire community in the development and

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defence work is necessary.

We have stated in an earlier Section of this article that the procedural institution created by Islam for the Muslim society was *shūrā* or mutual consultation. This procedural institution can be effectively implemented at higher levels only if it is effective at the basic level. The best and most realistic way to bring about *shūrā* at the basic level is, to our mind, the one which we have already described in some detail. This will ensure the participation of the most important functional forces of the society. With the combination of the two factors, viz., the religious leadership and the local executive, i.e., the Basic Democracies, the participation of the entire local community can be vouchsafed. But it should be pointed out that this entire structure has to be both aided and closely supervised by the Government. This is particularly necessary for a society like ours where the rural areas are vastly backward and are in need of constant supervision and control.

NOTES

1. See my article, 'The Status of the Individual in Islam', *Islamic Studies*, Vol. V, No. 4.
2. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York/London, 1952.
3. For example, " And let there be from among you a people who invite to goodness, and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong", III : 104.
4. The Qur'ān, XXXIII : 36, clearly lays down the broad limitations on the choice or freedom of the individual Muslim in his own personal affairs (*al-khiyaratu min 'amrihim*). For the efforts of the "hypocrites" to shirk their social responsibilities, see III : 166-68 ; VIII : 49 ; IX : 75-77, 101 ff. ; XXXIII : 12-15.
5. The Qur'ān, II : 83 ; IV : 36 ; XVI: 90. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) strongly recommends such enforcement basing his contention on the above-quoted passages of the Qur'ān, *al-Muḥallā*, Cairo, 1347 A.H,, V : 156.
6. LXIX : 33-37 ; LXXIV : 42-44 ; LXXXIX : 17-20 ; XC ; XCII ; CII ; CIV ; CVII , etc.
7. Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, Cairo, 1213 A. H., V : 411.
8. "Does man think that he will be left free (*sudan*) ?" (LXXV : 36).
9. "Those who, if We give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the *zakāh* and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong." (XXII: 41 also, III : 104, 110, 114 ; IX : 72)
10. The Qur'ān, LII : 21 ; LIII : 38-41 ; LXXIV : 38, etc. See my paper, 'The Status of the Individual in Islam', referred to above (n. 1), for more detailed discussion of the subject.

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11. II : 219, 266 ; III : 191 ; VI : 50 ; VII : 175, 183 ; X : 24 ; XIII : 3 ; XVI : 11, 44, 69 ; XVII : 84 ; XXX : 8, 21 ; XXXIX : 42 ; XLV : 12 ; LIX : 21, etc.
12. IX : 122.
13. Professor H. A. R. Gibb (*Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1947, 11) refers to a striking incident in the seventeenth century which shows "how futile the consensus of the learned was, even when supported by the secular power, against the pressure of public opinion." He describes how the *'ulamā'* unanimously took the view that coffee-drinking which had just spread in the Middle East, was unlawful and punishable with the same penalties as wine-drinking. A number of persons were actually executed for indulging in this "vicious practice." That was some two hundred years back. Now we all know how freely coffee is consumed in the Muslim world without any compunction. See, also, the article 'Kahwa' by C. Van Arendonk, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st edition.
14. The Qur'ān, XI : 84-87, gives the story of the Prophet Shu'ayb, how he introduced social and economic reforms and the unbelievers of Midian opposed him and insisted on their supposed right "to do what we will with our own property." Also, LXX : 24 ; L1 : 19.
15. III ; 159 ; XLII : 38.
16. II : 188 ; IV : 28 ; XVII : 33 ; XLIX : 11.
17. II : 187 ; 227-33.
18. XXV : 7.
19. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *Abwāb al-ruhūn* (Lucknow, 1315 A.H., 178), *Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ* (Nūr Muḥammad Press, Delhi, 1932), p. 258.
20. See, for instance, al-Sam'ānī, *Kitāb al-Ansāb*, Gibb Memorial Series, London, 1912, which is replete with such *nisbah* of the doctors of *Fiqh* and *Ḥadīth*, as *al-Ājurī* (the brick-layer), *al-Abbār* and *al-Ibrī* (the tailor), *al-Admī* (the dealer in hides and skin), *al-Aruzzī* (the rice dealer), *al-Anmāṭī* (the carpet merchant), *al-Baḥrānī* and *al-Baḥrī* (the sailor), *al-Bazzāz* (the cloth merchant), *al-Bawwāb* (the doorkeeper), *al-Baqlī* (the vegetable farmer or dealer), etc.
21. al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, xxxvii. 10.
22. Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Muḥallā*, Cairo, 1347 A.H. V : 156-57.
23. al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, xli. 2.
24. Abū Dā'ūd, *Sunan*, xl, 59 ; al-Nasa'ī, *Sunan*, xxxix, 22 ; al-Tirmidhī *Jāmi'*, xxv, 17 ; al-Dārimi, *Musnad*, xx. 41 ; and Ahmad b. Hanbal. *Musnad*, I : 351, II : 297 and IV : 102.

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